

## ATTACK RECOVERABILITY OF DRV POL SYSTEM

1. (S) Total POL storage capacity need not necessarily be large in relation to consumption, since storage is required only to accommodate successive increments of a total throughput, each for a time period normally relatively short and related to the rate of flow through the system. Thus in the context of expected continuation of US air attacks the DRV plan for earliest recovery of the necessary POL through-put capability would probably not attempt to replace the present system, but instead, to (1) provide some storage system of capacity and geographic distribution tailored to the most pressing consumption needs, and related to reception/distribution capabilities; and (2) build up a reception/distribution capability compatible with preferred delivery means (ocean-going tanker) and available distribution routes, both land and waterway. Some comments on these approaches follow.

2. (S) A very general estimate based on broad POL system architectural-engineering considerations is that POL operations comparable to those in the DRV would require system storage capacity of about 1.5 times monthly consumption. This would equate to some 32,000 MT capacity as indicated by the October-December 1965 POL imports (or of the order of one-sixth present capacity). Any capacity surviving our attack could contribute to this.

3. (S) Some alternate or supplementary storages are now under construction. The DRV has in progress a program of installing groups of small POL tanks in somewhat isolated locations throughout the Hanoi area. These groups range in number from 7 to 120 tanks each. The facilities are generally set into shallow excavations and are then earth-covered leaving only the vents and filling apparatus exposed. This construction was observed at several places in the Hanoi area in August, appeared to be an around-the-clock activity, and is expected to continue as rapidly as available materials allow. This

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DIA and JCS review(s) completed.

construction may have been in progress for the better part of a year but provides storage for less than 2,000 tons capacity, or less than one-sixteenth of the possible requirement. It could probably be accelerated with outside material and construction assistance. In addition, many small dispersed drum storages have been identified.

4. (S) Another substitute might be provided by floating storages. Ocean tankers for such potential employment are scarce in Bloc inventory, and probably could contribute more to the over-all problem if their sea mobility continued in use. There are a few known DRV coastal tankers/lighters, of about 200-300 tons each, which could be applied, but again, they would appear more valuable in a mobile role, specifically for offloading ocean tankers in the first step of the internal distribution process. In short, while floating storage is possible, it has undesirable features for the communists, and in any case can contribute to only a portion of the problem.

5. (S) The clearly preferable, if not indeed the only feasible, means for adequate POL delivery to the DRV is in bulk, either by ocean-going tanker or by coastal bulk lighterage from CHICOM ports such as Fort Bayard. Tanker deliveries would run 2,000-10,000 tons each. Bulk lighter offloads (as now done at Haiphong) could be done anywhere in harbor or roadstead, after which these lighters, or the coastal lighters previously mentioned, could then proceed further by water along the distribution chain, discharging into available storages or directly into tanker trucks, sampans, etc., for further forwarding.

6. (S) An alternative to bulk importation would be to package (drum) POL at some point for truck or sampan shipment into North Vietnam. This and the subsequent handling and distribution would involve cumbersome and costly handling over interdicted LOCs. Some would no doubt get through if the effort were sufficiently intense, but at disproportionate cost.

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7. (S) While the foregoing measures are largely conjectural they are nevertheless related to available indications. Further, these measures, which seem a "best available" course, can only be placed into effect over a significant time period for marshalling and organizing resources. This then leads to the general estimates that recuperability of the DRV POL system from attack is poor; loss of the receiving and distribution point at Haiphong would present particular problems; and several months at best would probably be required, with foreign assistance, to establish an alternate method for the import and distribution of POL in the quantities required.

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
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JCS 50  
NORTH VIETNAM  
**VINH PETROLEUM PRODUCTS STORAGE**  
18 40 09N 115 43 15E




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JCS 51.12  
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**NAM DINH**  
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


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Requirement 6. The Logistics Target System (Reference: Section VB, 1-4 of Terms of Reference)

Item Number 4: "Provide existing studies on feasibility and objectives to be achieved by aerial mining of ports in North Vietnam (NVN). Provide also detailed data on strikes, sorties, ordnance, etc. for initial mining and necessary restrikes."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that with seaborne traffic accounting for some 80 percent of DRV foreign trade, closure of the principal DRV ports is mandatory if this trade is to be halted. On 6 August 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM-608-65) that aerial mining be approved for inclusion in an early ROLLING THUNDER program.

Aerial mining of DRV ports was also included in recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for operations against NVN forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 10 November 1965 (JCSM-811-65) and again on 18 January 1966 (JCSM-41-66).

Attached hereto is <sup>a</sup>Joint J-3/DIA study on interdiction of the seaborne transportation system of North Vietnam. This study discusses the feasibility and objectives to be achieved by aerial mining of DRV ports. In addition, it provides detailed data on strikes, sorties, ordnance requirements, etc. for both initial mining and necessary restrikes.

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